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Wages and Prices by Formula
IN RECENT years our nation's economic policy has
been focused largely on the problem of unemployment. The
reasons for this concern are plain. The recovery from the reces-
sion of 1957—1958 failed to develop momentum and came to a
halt in the spring of 1960 when the unemployment rate was
still above 5 per cent. The new recession that followed proved
to be mild and brief. But when the labor force is growing and
becoming more productive, even a minor recession of business
activity can have serious repercussions. In the early months of
1961 unemployment reached 7 per cent, and the new Adminis-
tration, as was generally expected, embarked promptly on an
expansive economic policy.
At first the Administration placed its emphasis on increasing
federal expenditures and on creating as much monetary ease as
the state of our balance of payments might allow. Later, with
unemployment still hovering around 6 per cent, the need for a
more effective policy became clearer. Official interest gradually
shifted from raising federal expenditures to carrying out a
sweeping reduction of income tax rates, which still bore the
stamp of the Great Depression and World War II. After a pro-
Murray Lecture at State University of Iowa, November 10,1964. Re-
printed, by permission, from Harvard Business Review, March—April
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tracteddebate, Congress recognized the importance of revising
the tax system, and lower tax rates for individuals and cor-
porations became law. Meanwhile, the Administration promul-
gated more liberal rules for figuring depreciation on tax re-
turns, took some steps to improve the matching of jobs and
skills in labor markets, and pressed for an extension of mone-
tary ease.
By and large, the economy has responded well to the new
direction of economic policy. Of late, production and employ-
ment have increased materially, and the unemployment rate
has been moving gradually downward.
I. PROGRESS WITHOUT INFLATION
In pursuing its expansive economic policy, the Administration
has been aware of the risk that unbalanced budgets and rapid
additions to the money supply may set off a new wave of infla-
tion. That can hardly be a pleasant prospect for any govern-
ment under modem conditions. The impact of inflation on the
purchasing power of families living on pensions or other types
of fixed income issevere. Also, inflation commonly bears
harder on those who work for a salary than on wage earners,
and it deals harshly with anyone whose plans for the future
depend on savings accumulated in the form of bank deposits,
shares of savings and loan associations, government savings
bonds, and the like. These injustices of inflation tend to breed
political discontent, and so, too, does the widespread aware-
ness that inflation is often the precursor of recessions. When
costs and prices begin advancing rapidly, experience has
shown that speculation in inventories and overbuilding tend to
develop, that the strength of economic expansion tends to be
undermined in the process, and that prosperity is then liable to
give way to recession.234The Business Cycle in a Changing World
Moreover, the precarious condition of the balance of pay-
ments has lately added a dimension of risk to inflation that we,
unlike an earlier generation of Americans, cannot ignore. Since
1958 our country has experienced a massive outflow of gold
and a still larger increase in its short-term liabilities to foreign-
ers. The United States has continued to serve as banker of the
world; but any banker whose reserves dwindle while his de-
mand liabilities keep mounting will inevitably invite caution
on the part of those who deal with him.
Fortunately, our wholesale price level has recently remained
stable while much of the rest of the world has suffered inula-
tion. This development has served to keep down the deficit in
our balance of payments, but it has not sufficed to eliminate it.
Therefore, if our price level should rise in relation to that of
competing nations, our exports would tend to diminish relative
to imports. Unless major steps were taken to counteract such a
development, the deficit in our international accounts would
become larger, and this could lead to a run on the dollar and
its ultimate devaluation. The attending financial crisis would
unsettle commercial and industrial markets throughout the
world. It would leave a legacy of fear that could result in a
lasting constriction of international trade and investment.
Worse still, it might injure fatally our country's foreign prestige
and, therefore, its capacity for political leadership of the Free
World.
Clearly, the risks of inflation are formidable, and they are
recognized as such in informed circles both within and outside
government. Thus, in formulating the nation's economic goals,
the President's Economic Report of 1962 emphasized "the
achievement of full employment and sustained prosperity,"
and urged such an achievement "without inflation."
But how can inflation be avoided? Government authorities
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theydid during the 1950's and in earlier times. They have,
however, made it plain that they would be disinclined, as long
as the economy is still operating short of full employment, to
seek general price stability by imposing monetary or fiscal re-
straints. And the one need that they have stressed above all
others is that wages and prices be set in "responsible" fashion
by private parties—in other words, that trade union leaders
and business managers need to moderate their economic
power in ways which will take account of the national interest
in preventing inflation.
II. ADVENT OF GUIDEPOSTS
Exhortation with regard to prices or wages is by no means a
novel practice of government. In its days of secular authority,
the Church spoke firmly on the need for just pricing, in later
times governments often blamed profiteers for increases in
food prices. In the postwar period it has become customary for
governments to stress the importance of stability in the general
level of prices rather than the rectitude of individual prices. As
of old, however, the authorities seek to limit private power in
the marketplace by moral suasion. In today's world, as every-
one knows, some trade unions can raise wages beyond the
level that would prevail in a competitive labor market, just as
some corporations have the power to push prices above com-
petitive levels.
It is understandable enough, therefore, why our successive
presidents in the postwar period have seen fit to lecture the
private community on the need for noninflationary conduct.
General Eisenhower, for example, warned during his presi-
dency that "businesses must recognize the broad public inter-
est in the prices set on their products and services" and that
"greater stability of the general level of prices" is unlikely Un-236TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing World
less the national average of increases in wage and salary rates
and related labor benefits remains within the limits of national
productivity gains."
In the last few years governmental pronouncements of this
sort have become more frequent and louder. In fact, the
urging of moderation on private parties has reached a scale
that marks something of a break from the earlier policy of
dealing with inflation. On the one hand, the classical weapons
of monetary and fiscal restraint, which in the past were relied
on as the main defense against inflation, are now frowned on.
On the other hand, general appeals to public responsibility are
being implemented by wage and price guideposts. Trade
unions and business firms, in other words, are no longer merely
asked or admonished to moderate theft private power in the
public interest; they are advised with a show of specificity
how this can best be done.
Once exhortation has been fortified by formula, it can no
longer be dismissed as sheer rhetoric. It then takes on new au-
thority over the minds of men, and its capacity for good or ill
becomes much greater.
The guideposts have been a major part of the Administra-
tion's economic policy since early 1962, when they were first
set forth by the Council of Economic Advisers. What are these
guideposts or guidelines?
1. Wages—This guideline specifies that the annual rate of
increase in wage rates, including fringe benefits, should be
equal in a particular firm or industry to the annual trend in-
crease in national productivity, that is, to the average annual
percentage rate of growth over a term of years in the output
per man-hour of the economy at large.
2. Prices—This guideline specifies that when the trend of an
industry's productivity rises less than the national trend of pro-
ductivity, its prices "can appropriately rise enough" to accom-Wages and Prices by Formula 237
modatethe rise in labor costs per unit of output that conforms
to the wage guideline; and that when an industry's productivity
rises more rapidly than the national average, its prices "should
be lowered" in keeping with the decline in unit labor costs.
The Council originally characterized its pronouncement on
the guidelines as a contribution to public discussion of how the
national interest may be judged in the case of private wage
and price decisions. The guidelines were certainly not intended
to be interpreted as directives to industry or labor. In fact,
they were described by the Council as "general guideposts"
which still had to be reconciled in individual situations with
"objectives of equity and efficiency." In other words, "specific
modifications" were required to adapt the guidelines "to the
circumstances of particular industries."
The more important types of modification that would be
likely to arise in practice were actually listed by the Council.
For example, the suggestion was advanced that wage increases
should exceed the "general guide rate" if the bargaining posi-
lion of workers in a particular industry or locality had previ-
ously been weak or if an industry was unable to attract sufli-
cient labor.
As was bound to happen, however, it was the crisp formula
of the "general guideposts," not the qualifications or disclaim-
ers, that mainly caught the public eye. And, with the passage
of time, the Administration has itself become bolder. The Jan-
uary 1964 Report of the Council no longer speaks of the guide-
lines as a contribution to public discussion of how the national
interest may be judged; instead, it describes them as a "stan-
dard" for private wage and price decisions. The Report of 1962
had avoided specifying the annual trend increase of national
productivity on the ground that this was "a large and complex
subject and there is much still to be learned." The Report of
1964, on the other hand, is free from all methodological doubts238The Business Cycle in a Changing World
and presents without qualification a figure of 3.2 per cent as
the annual trend increase of productivity in the private econ-
omy that is currently applicable. The Report of 1962 had indi-
cated that the "general guideposts" were "only first approxima-
tions" that would need to be adapted extensively "to the
circumstances of particular industries." The Report of 1964, on
the other hand, states flatly that the guideposts "can cover the
vast majority of wage and price decisions" and, while the
modifications that had been suggested earlier "still apply,
it must be emphasized that they are intended to apply to only
a relatively few cases."
Thus, the official position, as now developed or clarified, is
that the national interest can be best served by setting wages
and prices in accordance with the formula of the general
guidelines—not, to be sure, in every instance, but almost that.
III. GUIDEPOSTS VS. COMPETITIVE MARKETS
As every economist knows, there are only two ways of raising
the real earnings of labor. They can be raised by (1) increas-
ing output per man-hour of work or (2) enlarging the share of
total income that accrues to wage and salary workers.
Of these two sources, the first is basic, and it has always
been vastly more important in our country than the second.
The guidelines have the great merit of calling attention to this
fact. Taking the economy as a whole, it is the cost of labor that
dominates production costs. If the cost of labor per unit of out-
put rises, business firms will ordinarily seek to protect theft
profit margins by raising prices. But a rise in wage rates, using
this term broadly so as to include fringe benefits, need not in-
volve a rise in production costs. It will do that only if the rise
in the hourly wage rate is proportionately greater than the in-Wages and Prices by Formula239
creasein output per man-hour. Therefore, if the average per-
centage increase in wage rates across the nation merely equals
the average percentage increase in output per man-hour, the
general level of prices could remain stable without reducing
the fraction of the nation's output accruing to stockholders and
other income claimants.
By expressing this basic truth, the guideposts have helped
to direct the attention of thoughtful citizens to ways of raising
output per man-hour—ways such as investing in more and bet-
ter tools of production, improving the education and skills of
workers, improving the quality of management, and eliminat-
ing featherbedding and restrictive trading practices.
Public enlightenment, however, has been an incidental
aspect of the guideposts. Being a tool of policy, they point to a
course of action. Their essential purpose is to curb inflation—
or, more precisely, to permit monetary and fiscal policies to
stimulate production and employment without stirring up in-
flationary pressures from trade unions or corporations. And if
the guidelines for prices and wages were generally observed, it
is indeed true that the existing links between the flow of
money to markets, on the one hand, and the flow of goods and
services to purchasers, on the other, would be broken. In such
a world the levels of wages and prices would be governed by
formula, and they would no longer reflect the changing forces
of market demand and market supply—as they now do.
If the policy of the guideposts became fully effective, it
would therefore change drastically the workings of our com-
modity and labor markets, and thereby modify—for better or
worse—the character of our economic system. Let us try to
visualize a little more definitely how the guideposts, if they
were generally and fully respected, would work out in prac-
lice.240The Business Cycle in a Changing World
Statistical records stretching back into the nineteenth cen-
tuiydemonstratethat, although the over-all productivity of
our economy occasionally declines, its trend has been steadily
upward. If this continues to be true, as we may reasonably
suppose, general observance of the guidelines will result in
higher wages every year, regardless of the stage of the business
cycle or the level of unemployment or the state of the balance
of payments. The rise of wages will be the same, on the aver-
age, in years of recession as in years of prosperity; but in any
given recession the rise of wages could easily be larger than in
the preceding years of prosperity. Furthermore, the average
wage will tend to rise in any given year by the same percent-
age in every firm, regardless of its profitability or the state of
the market for different kinds of labor.
However, general observance of the guidepost for prices will
not freeze individual prices or the relations among them. What
it would tend to freeze is (1) the general level of prices and
(2) the ratio of individual prices to unit labor costs of produc-
tion. The tendency of the price-cost ratio to remain constant
will be stronger in some industries than in others. Strictly
speaking, the guidepost for prices specifies merely that the
ratio of price to unit labor cost of production should not rise; it
does not argue against a decline of the price-cost ratio. Hence,
firms or industries experiencing a weak demand for their
products or keen foreign competition may need to be content
with prices that decline relative to their unit labor costs. On
the other hand, firms or industries that are favored in the mar-
ketplace would be unable to raise prices relative to their unit
labor costs even if theft incoming orders were many times as
large as theft production. Nor would they be able to raise
prices to compensate for increases in costs of production other
than those of labor.
The broad effect of these tendencies would be to keep moreWages and Prices by Fonnula 241
or tess constant the percentage share of the national incomc—
or of national output—going to labor. Changes in the use of
capital relative to the use of labor, whether upward or down-
ward, could still have a large influence on the size of the na-
tional income but not on the proportion of income accruing to
labor. Unless major shifts occurred in the occupational or
industrial distribution of employment, any fluctuation in la-
bor's percentage share of the national income would be due
primarily to the discrepancy between the movement of over-all
productivity in a particular year and the corresponding trend
increase. Nonlabor income, in the aggregate, would also tend
to be a constant percentage of the national income.
It is well to bear in mind, however, that since profits are
only a fraction of nonlabor income, the share of profits in the
total national income could either rise or decline. In the post-
war period, the amount paid by corporations on account of ex-
cises, customs duties, property taxes, licensing fees, and other
indirect taxes has risen more rapidly than their net output. If
this trend continues, the income share of investors in the cor-
porate sector will tend to undergo a persistent decline, while
that of labor will tend to remain constant.
Inthehypothetical economythatIhavesketched,
monopolies—whether of business or labor—would no longer
have the power to push up the price level. Put more precisely,
if trade unions and business firms complied voluntarily with
the guidelines, they would relinquish any market power that
they have not yet used or that they might gain in the future.
This is worth noting, but it is not the main point.
The fundamental point of the preceding analysis is that gen-
era! observance of the guideposts would throttle the forces of
competition no less effectively than those of monopoly. The
point is important because, unlike much of the rest of the
world, the rivalry among U.S. business firms is very keen. Even242The Business Cycle in a Changing World
inindustries where a few corporations dominate the market—
as in the case of automobiles, steel, and aluminum—each cor-
poration competes actively against the others in its industry,
against rival products of other industries, and against foreign
suppliers. Competition in labor markets is also stronger than
casual references to labor monopoly may suggest. After all,
only a little over a fourth of the population working for wages
or salaries is unionized, and many of the trade unions are
weak. By and large, it is competition—not monopoly—that has
vast sweep and power in our everyday life. Since free competi-
live markets would virtually cease to exist in an economy that
observed the guidelines, this transformation of the economy
merits serious reflection.
To be sure, compliance with the guidelines would be volun-
tary in the economy we are considering. That, however, may
not mean much. For when economic freedom is not exercised,
it is no longer a part of life. As far as I can see, an economy in
which wages and prices are set voluntarily according to a for-
mula suggested by the government would be almost indistin-
guishable from an economy in which wages and prices are di-
rectly fixed by governmental authorities. In either case, the
movement of resources toward uses that are favored by the
buying public would be impeded. In either case, the tendency
to economize on the use of what happens to be especially
scarce, whether it be materials or labor or equipment, would
be weakened. In either case, since prices will no longer tend to
equate demand and supply in individual markets, some form
of rationing would need to be practiced.
In all likelihood, therefore, a shift from our present market
economy to one of voluntary compliance with the guidelines
would adversely affect elEciency. It would also adversely affect
the rate of economic growth and the rate of improvement of
the general standard of living.Wages and Prices by Fonnula243
It is true,ofcourse, that controlled economies can and do
escape complete rigidity. The exigencies of lifedonot permit
their authorities to be blind to considerations of efficiency or
social harmony, so that price and wage edicts have to be moth-
fled here and there. Black markets tend to develop, and—
despite their unsavory character—they often perform a useful
function in facilitating production. Moreover, managers gradu-
ally become skillful in "gray practices," such as reclassifying
labor in order to escape the wage restraints or modifying
products in order to escape the price restraints. Our hypotheti-
cal economy of voluntary compliance would also have its
safety valve; that is to say, the guidelines would be modified in
"a relatively few cases" in the interest of equity or efficiency.
However, gray or black markets, which impart some fluidity
and resilience to authoritarian economies, could not exist in the
economy of voluntary compliance that we have been consider-
ing here.
IV. ARE THE GUIDES WORKABLE?
This theoretical sketch of how our economy would work if the
guidelines were generally and fully observed has blinked insti-
tutional factors—such as the adjustments caused by the disap-
pearance of auction markets, the new role of trade unions, and
so on. Moreover, our theoretical sketch has tacitly assumed
that voluntary compliance with the guidelines is merely a mat-
ter of will. Life is not that simple. Even if everyone responded
to the government's plea for "cooperation" and sought faith-
fully to act in accordance with the guidelines, it would fre-
quently be difficult or actually impossible to do so.
There is, first of all, a vast gap in our statistical arsenal. To
comply with the guideline for wages, businessmen would need
to know the trend increase of the over-all output of the nation244TheBusinessCycle in a Changing World
per man-hour. Once this highly complex magnitude had been
estimated by the government, it would presumably be sub-
jected to outside review, revised if need be, and accompanied
by a specification of the boundaries of the year (if a year be
the interval) to which it would apply. All firms dealing with
labor, except those newly established, would then know what
wage adjustment was expected of them.
Compliance with the price guideline would be infinitely
harder. For this purpose, every company would need to know
the trend increase in the productivity of its ownindustryand
how this increase compares with the trend increase of over-all
productivity of the economy. Such information is not generally
available, nor is it readily usable.
The productivity indexes now being published, besides being
often out of date, lump together a great variety of products. In
time, more detailed and more current indexes of productivity
will doubtless be constructed, but there are limits to what is
statistically feasible. Even if measures of this type become
available for each of a thousand or ten thousand industries,
much confusion or perplexity will still remain. Should a manu-
facturer of bricks, for example, be guided in his pricing by an
index of productivity for the stone, clay, and glass group or by
an index confined to brick manufacture? If the latter, is the
pertinent index a nationwide measure, one confined to his
region, or perhaps to his locality or plant? How should a
manufacturing firm proceed when its output is not standard-
ized or when it makes a hundred different items, instead of just
one product? If the appropriate index is not available, as may
long remain the case for many firms, especially in the service
trades, what is the best "proxy" for it? Will the judgment of a
company's management on such issues, even if made entirely
in good faith, be acceptable to others—such as its trade union,
the Council of Economic Advisers, or the general public—whoWages and Prices by Formula 245
also seek only what is right? Better statistics on productivity
will reduce these difficulties; however, they cannot possibly re-
move them.
Another puzzling problem would be posed by changes in the
composition of labor that is used in industry. Consider, for ex-
ample, the case of a company that has recently decided to
employ more skilled workers of different sorts and less un-
skilled labor. Since skilled labor is compensated at a higher
rate, the average wage per hour that is paid by the company to
its workers will go up, quite apart from any wage increase that
may be needed for the individual grades of labor. Let us now
suppose that the wage guidepost calls for an increase of, say, 3
per cent. Then the company's employees will naturally expect
an increase of this size in their individual rates of pay. But may
not the company's personnel executive, who has become
steeped in the mathematics of the guidelines, properly insist
that the average wage has already gone up this much or more
on account of the more intensive use of skilled labor and that
no increase of wage rates is therefore warranted by the gov-
ernment's guideline? Will the trade union's representative
grasp this statistical subtlety? Will he not argue that the guide-
line requires an increase of 3 per cent, that other organizations
areputtingthrough such increases, and that simple justice re-
quires that the same be done by this company? Suppose that
the personnel executive perseveres and finally convinces the
union's representative. Will the latter, in turn, be able to per-
suade the company's employees? Can we even be sure that the
company's board of directors will be convinced by the argu-
ment of its personnel officer? In view of modem trends that
emphasize the use of higher skills, this sort of difficulty would
be bound to occur frequently in an economy of voluntary
compliance.
A related puzzle with which businesmen would need to246TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing World
grapple arises from changes in the composition of output. Sup-
pose that a firmhastwo plants, that each of them makes a
unique product, that the output per man-hour is constant in
each plant, but that the two plants differ in efficiency. If the
wage guidepost calls for a 3 per cent increase in wages, it
might appear, since no improvement of productivity has oc-
curred in either plant, that a corresponding increase in the
price of each of the two products is justified by the guideline
for prices. But are price advances really proper if the firm has
shifted some workers from the less efficient to the more effi-
cient of its two plants and thereby raised the output per man-
hour of the entire firm as much as or more than the trend
increase of national productivity? In that event, does the
guidepost for prices require that the productivity of each
plant be taken separately or that the two be taken in combi-
nation?
Another problem that businessmen and trade-union leaders
would need to face is whether the modifications of the guide-
posts that the Council of Economic Advisers has officially sanc-
tioned apply iii a particular case. In assuming, as I have, a
general willingness to comply with the guidelines, I have not
meant to abstract from human nature entirely. Since the modi-
fications suggested by the Council are phrased in very general
terms, men acting in good faith may feel that their situation is
precisely the kind of rare case that permits some departure
from the guidelines. But will business managers and labor
leaders always or even frequently agree in theft interpretation
of what modifications are permissible? In any event, is it not
likely that the modifications will turn out to be numerous,
rather than, as now intended by the Administration, relatively
few?
In view of these and many other problems that are bound to
arise in practice, the guidelines would prove unworkable overWages and Prices by Formula247
avery large segment of industry, even if everyone sought con-
scientiously to observe them. To deal with thiscriticaldiAl-
cult>', a new governmental apparatus might need to be estab-
lished; its function would be to spell out detailed rules and to
interpret them in individual cases. Although there is no way of
telling just how such an agency would work, it seems reason-
able to expect that not a few of its clarifying rules and inter-
pretalions would be arbitrary, that its advisory rulings would
at times involve considerable delay and thereby cause some
economic trouble, and that the rulings themselves would have
at least some inflationary bias. These factors inevitably cast a
cloud over the preceding analysis of how an economy of volun-
tar>' compliance would function, but they hardly make the
prospect more inviting.
V. SPECTER OF CONTROLS
J have as yet said nothing about the aspect of guidepost policy
that has aroused the most skepticism—namely, the likelihood
ofgeneral observance on a voluntary basis. In recent years
unemployment has been fairly large, and many industries have
bad sufficient capacity to increase output readily. Under such
conditions, upward pressure on prices cannot be great. Even
so, the guidelines have been sharply criticized or defied by
powerful segments of the business and labor community. The
critical test of the inhibiting power of the guidelines will come,
of course, when both labor and commodity markets become
appreciably lighter—and this test may come soon. If the recent
wage settlement in the automobile industry is at all indicative,
expectations of a high degree of compliance with the guide-
lines are hardly warranted. Similar experiments in other coun-
tries also suggest that general price stability will not long be
maintained through voluntary restraint.248The Business Cycleina Changing World
But once the government in power has committed itself to a
policy, it may become difficult to move off in a new direction.
A strong commitment to the policy of the guidelines inevitably
means that any extensive private defiance would, besides fnis-
trating the government's anti-inflation policy, injure its pres-
tige. There is always a possibility, therefore, that failure to
comply voluntarily with the guidelines will be followed by
some coercive measure. This might initially take the form, as
has frequently been proposed, of a review by a governmental
board of the facts surrounding the price or wage changes that
are being contemplated. The thought behind proposals of this
nature is that once the facts are clearly developed, the force of
public opinion will ordinarily suffice to ensure "responsible" ac-
tions by corporations and trade unions.
No one can be sure whether this expectation will be fulfilled.
But if it is, the governmental review board will have virtually
become an agency for fixing prices and wages. If, on the other
hand, the board's reports were flouted with any frequency, the
next step might well be outright price and wage fixing by the
government. It would seem, therefore, that from whatever an-
gle we examine the guidelines, direct controls pop up danger-
ously around the corner.
This danger must not be dismissed as an illusion. Although
the guidelines are still in their infancy, they have already hard-
ened, as I previously indicated. Nor has the evolution of the
Administration's thinking concerning the guidelines been con-
fined to a literary plane. In April 1962, only three months after
the announcement of the guidelines, the Administration moved
sternly to force the leading steel companies to cancel the price
increases that they had just posted. This interference with the
workings of a private market had no clear sanction in law, and
it caused consternation in business circles. Fortunately, a crisis
was avoided by a prompt and concerted effort of the Adminis-Wages and Prices by Formula 249
t.ration, in which President Kennedy himself took the leading
part,torestore business confidence.
Since then, the government has been more cautious. But it
has continued to espouse the need for moderation in the mat-
ter of wages and prices, and now and then has even gently rat-
tled its sword. Early in 1964 President Johnson requested the
Council to reaffirm the guideposts. He emphasized his commit-
ment to this policy by adding that he would "keep a close
watch on price and wage developments, with the aid of an
early warning system which is being set up." Last summer,
when intimations of a rise in the price of steel appeared in the
press, the President lost no time in declaring that such action
would "strongly conflict with our national interest in price sta-
bility."
VI. TOWARD SOUNDER POLICIES
As this account of recent history suggests, the guidepost policy
may, under the pressure of events, move our nation's economy
in an authoritarian direction. The danger may not yet be large,
in view of prevailing political attitudes, but it could become
serious in a time of trouble or emergency. And this is not the
only risk, as I shall presently note. However, the fact that
many citizens both within and outside government favor the
guidelines must also be considered, for it means that they see
smaller risks or larger advantages in this policy than 1 do.
It may readily be granted that the guidepost policy has the
meritorious objective of blunting the power of monopolists to
push up the price level. This is the feature of the policy that its
proponents often stress. Indeed, they are apt to argue that it
matters litfie in practice whether or not the bulk of the eco-
nomic community pays any attention to the guidelines—as long
as the major corporations and trade unions do so.250TheBusinessCycle in a Changing World
But if the guidelines are circumscribed in this fashion, they
are still subject to the criticism of interfering with the competi-
five forces of the markets in which many major corporations
actually operate. Moreover, the absence of a precise indication
of what firms, industries, or trade unions are covered by the
guidelines can create a mood of uncertainty that will militate
against compliance. Not least important, the effectiveness of
the guidelines in curbing inflation becomes doubtful when
their application is restricted. For the very limitation on wage
and price increases in the guideline sector of the economy
would facilitate increases in the uncovered sector whenever an
expansive economic policy generated a monetary demand that
grew faster than the supply of goods and services.
Another argument frequently advanced in favor of the
guideposts is that if they were in fact respected on a sufficient
scale, then profit margins would tend to be maintained and the
chances of prolonging the current business expansion would
therefore be improved. This consideration is bound to count in
men's thinking at a time when our nation is striving to reduce
unemployment and to spread prosperity. We must not, how-
ever, become so absorbed in today's problems that we overlook
those that will haunt us in a later day. If the guidelines may
stretch out the expansion now by helping to maintain the rela-
tively high profit margins of prosperity, may they not at some
later time stretch out contraction by serving to maintain the
low profit margins of recession?
Let me add, also, that I recognize that the guideline policy
was adopted by the Administration only after it had given
serious consideration to alternatives. The thought of its eco-
nomists apparently is that, in general, monetary and fiscal tools
must be used to promote expansion as long as the economy is
not operating at full employment; that other devices must
therefore be employed (in the absence of full employment) toWages and Prices by Formula 251
prevent inflation; that policies aimingtoincrease competition
or to improve productivity cannot accomplish much in the
short run or cannot be pushed hard for political reasons; that
direct controls of wages and prices cannot and should not be
seriously considered under peacetime conditions; that conse-
quently, there is only one major way left for curbing immecli-
ate inflation—namely, through devices of exhortation; and that
the guidelines for wages and prices are merely a promising
specific application of the technique of exhortation.
Space will not permit me to unravel this complicated argu-
ment, but I at least want to suggest why I think it may be
faulty. Once the government looks to trade unions and busi-
ness firms to stave off inflation, there is a danger that it will not
discharge adequately its own traditional responsibility of con-
trolling the money supply and of maintaining an environment
of competition. In the past our own and other governments
have often found it convenient to blame profiteers, corpora-
tions, or trade unions for a rising price level. Only rarely have
they pointed the finger of blame at their own policies—such as
flooding the economy with newly created currency or bank de-
posits.
To the extent that the government relies on private compli-
ance with its guidelines for prices and wages, it may more
easily be tempted to push an expansive monetary and fiscal
policy beyond prudent limits. Besides, it may fail to resist
strongly enough the political pressure for higher minimum
wages, larger trade union immunities, higher farm price sup-
ports, higher import duties, more import quotas, larger stock-
piling programs, and other protective measures that serve
either to raise prices or to prevent them from falling.
One of the major needs of our times is to give less heed to
special interest groups and to reassert the paramount interest
of consumers in vigorous competition. The political obstacles252The Business Cycle in a Changing Work!
to reducing artificial props for prices are undoubtedly formi-
dable. However, reforms of this typc—supplemented by more
stringent antitrust laws, effective enforcement of these laws,
and reasonable steps to curb featherbedding—are likely to
contribute more to the maintenance of reasonable stability in
the general price level than will the guidelines for wages and
prices on which we have recently come to rely.
Another major need of our times is for better guidelines to
aid the government itself in formulating and carrying out its
economic policies. The widespread tendency of attributing
most existing unemployment to a deficiency of aggregate de-
mand is an oversimplification. When the amount of unemploy-
ment is larger than the number of job vacancies at existing
wages, the aggregate demand for labor is clearly insufficient to
provide employment for everyone who is able, willing, and
seeking to work. At such a time, a deficiency of aggregate de-
mand exists, and a governmental policy that relies on monetary
and fiscal devices to expand demand is, in principle, well
suited to the nation's needs. On the other hand, when the num-
ber of vacant jobs is equal to or larger than the number of the
unemployed, there is no deficiency of aggregate demand. A
government that is seriously concerned about inflation will not
pursue an expansive monetary and fiscal policy at such a time,
and—instead of lecturing the private community on the need
for moderation—will itself lead the nation in a policy of re-
straint. This does not mean its concern about unemployment
will cease but, rather, that it will direct its policy measures to-
ward better matching of the men and women who seek work
with the jobs that need to be filled.
A sensible guideline for monetary and fiscal policy is, there-
fore, not the volume or rate of unemployment as such, but the
relation between the number of the unemployed and the num-
ber of job vacancies. As yet, such a guideline is merely aWages and Prices by FormuLa 253
theorist's dream because statistics on job vacancies hardly exist
in our country. There are grounds for hoping, however, that
this condition will be corrected in another few years, so that
we will become better equipped for promoting our national
goals.
The problem of achieving and maintaining prosperity with-
out inflation in a free society is a very duff cult one. We must be
willing as a people to seek out and to explore new ways of
meeting this critical challenge of our times. But we also must
remain mindful of the lessons of past experiencc—particularly,
the need for prudent control of the money supply and the need
for maintaining and enhancing the forces of competition. The
progress that we make will depend heavily on the economic
understanding of citizens and the intensity of theft interest in
pubhc pohcies.